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Cornell Researchers Use Countermeasures for Detecting 'Spoofed' GPS Signals

Cornell researchers have resolved that creating countermeasures can eliminate hacking or ‘spoofing’ of GPS technology.

Directed by Professor Mark Psiaki, the research team tested their security against GPS spoofing last month at a demonstration in the New Mexico desert, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security. Led by the Professor at University of Texas, Todd Humphreys, the spoofing of mini helicopter's GPS signal was demonstrated on June 19. As a designer of advanced GPS spoofing system, Humphreys delivered a presentation on the threat of GPS spoofing on July 19 in front of Congress.

GPS serves to be a navigation and timing system of satellites that revolve around the Earth and relays signals to sea, land and air receivers. GPS provides accurate information on the locations and clock offsets of the receivers. GPS can be deployed for control of the power grid, automated stock trades, and cell phone towers and in commercial as well as military aircraft navigation.

Spoofing is the process of sending false GPS signals to receivers who will consider it as authentic ones. In this way, hackers can achieve control over GPS-dependent vehicles, planes, or other devices.

Humphreys and his research team used live "on-air" transmissions to demonstrate the effect of spoofing on works. A remote area in New Mexico was selected for demonstration, where a mini drone was hijacked using fake GPS transmissions at a distance of 0.3-mi. It was however hovering around in desired altitude in reality but it was assumed to be accidentally climbing and hence resulted in intense plunging.

Cornell researchers concurrently tested a receiver modification, which is capable of distinguishing spoofed GPS signals from real ones. According to Psiaki, the researchers employed the latest countermeasure for precise detection of spoofing in three cases during the demonstration. However, ‘Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring’, the existing GPS anti-spoofing technology, has limited adoption capabilities with the 2008-developed smarter spoofers.

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